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Abstract Fundamental results in the theory of extensive form games have
singled out the reduced normal form as the key representation of a game in
terms of strategic equivalence. In a precise sense, the reduced normal form
contains all strategically relevant information. This note shows that a diffi-
culty with the concept has been overlooked so far: given a reduced normal
form alone, it may be impossible to reconstruct the game’s extensive form
representation.
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1 Introduction
Most game-theoretic solution concepts are defined in the normal form, that is,
as (sets of) strategy profiles, e.g., iteratively undominated strategies, rational-
izable strategies (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984), curb sets (Basu and Weibull,
1991), tenable blocks (Myerson and Weibull, 2015), and of course Nash equi-
librium (Nash, 1950, 1951). A number of refinements of Nash equilibrium,
on the other hand, rely on the extensive form representation, e.g., subgame
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2 Carlos Alo´s-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger
perfection (Selten, 1965), quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), or se-
quential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Some refinements are defined
in the agent normal form and then translated to the extensive form game
(Selten, 1975).
All known refinement concepts that are defined in the extensive form suf-
fer from a fragility, though. An extensive form game can often be written
down in different ways, reflecting the inessential transformations introduced
by Thompson (1952) and Elmes and Reny (1994) (see also Battigalli et al.,
2020). And yet, these transformation do affect refinement criteria that are
based on the extensive form. That is, a subgame perfect or sequential equi-
librium may cease to be so after an inessential (Thompson) transformation;
or a mere Nash equilibrium may become subgame perfect or sequential af-
ter such a transformation. Since these transformations of the extensive form
only generate different “framings” of the same problem, this fragility appears
undesirable, at least from a rationalistic viewpoint.1
In the normal form two pure strategies of a player are strategically equiva-
lent if they give the same payoffs to all players for all strategy profiles among
the opponents. The (pure-strategy) reduced normal form is obtained by col-
lapsing all strategically equivalent strategies to single representatives. Two dif-
ferent extensive form representations can be obtained from each other through
inessential transformations (Thompson, 1952; Elmes and Reny, 1994) if and
only if their reduced normal forms coincide (see, e.g., Thompson, 1952; Perea,
2001; Ritzberger, 2002). That is, the reduced normal form is unaffected by
those transformations. This fact, and the fragility of equilibrium concepts
based on the extensive form, have led many researchers to insist on the pri-
ority of the reduced normal form, or even the mixed-strategy reduced normal
form, as in the strategic stability debate (e.g., Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986;
Mertens, 1989, 1991; Hillas, 1990; Vermeulen and Jansen, 1998). Yet, the gist
of extensive form refinements is to capture backwards induction, which by its
very nature is an extensive form notion, and hence normal forms remain un-
satisfactory. A major advance, and a vehicle to bring backwards induction to
bear on normal form concepts, was the seminal result by van Damme (1984):
A proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) induces a quasi-perfect (hence, sequen-
tial) equilibrium in every extensive form game with the given normal form. So,
1 This is especially important for research programs adopting the position that implicit
or self-referential equilibrium concepts should be formalized in a framework which clearly
specifies the details, order, and dependence of the possible actions and interactions of all
involved agents. This is because the latter necessarily results in an extensive form game,
which may in principle be susceptible to inessential transformations. An example of such a
research program is given by Glycopantis et al. (2001, 2003, 2005, 2009). This also extends
to the Nash program (Nash, 1953) about giving non-cooperative foundations to cooperative
games, because those often lead to extensive form games. A case in point are bargaining
games where the extensive form explicitly specifies the bargaining protocol (e.g., Rubinstein,


































































Reduced Normal Forms Are Not Extensive Forms 3
proper equilibrium appears to be a sufficient condition to integrate backwards
induction into normal form analysis.2
Two extensive form games that have the same normal form also share the
same (pure-strategy) reduced normal form. Hence, to find an equilibrium that
satisfies backwards induction and is robust to inessential transformations of the
extensive form it is enough to determine a proper equilibrium in the reduced
normal form—or apply one of the stronger set-valued solution concepts. This
is comforting and provides support to the position that the normal form is
sufficient.
Yet, one aspect is easily overlooked. This position is preference-dependent.
It depends on payoffs because strategic equivalence depends on payoffs, hence
on the players’ preferences. In the reduced normal form, the payoffs of two
different strategies against all profiles of strategies of the other players may
coincide because the strategies lead to the same “outcome” (for example, be-
cause the strategies differ only on unreached parts of the tree), or because
they lead to different outcomes which happen to give the same payoffs. That
is, the (payoff-based) reduced normal form cannot distinguish between coin-
cidental payoff ties (preference-based) and fundamental ties arising from the
extensive form. It is well-known, however, that an analogous notion applies to
a pure representation of the rules of the game without payoffs: Two strate-
gies of a player are strategically equivalent if they induce the same plays (or
“outcomes”) for all strategy profiles among the opponents.3 If such a pure rep-
resentation of the rules of the game without payoff assignments is adopted,4
there is still a “normal form” where now strategies map into plays rather than
payoff vectors, and there is a corresponding reduced normal form.
From this perspective, we show that a new problem emerges: The reduced
normal form may not be the normal form of any extensive form, if both repre-
sentations are preference-free (alternatively, the players’ preference orderings
over plays are robust to sufficiently small perturbations). Put differently, with
an equilibrium in a given reduced normal form, in order to go back and recon-
struct the extensive form and “what happens in equilibrium,” one would still
need information about the reduction steps that led to the reduced normal
form.
To emphasize that again, the example below, by which we show that a
reduced normal form may not be the normal form of any extensive form, is
formulated as a “game form,” that is, without payoffs. Instead, strategy profiles
2 Many of the stronger set-valued refinement concepts always contain a proper equilib-
rium, e.g., M-stable sets (Mertens, 1989, 1991) or equilibrium components with non-zero
index (Ritzberger, 1994). As far as these sets are contained in connected components of
Nash equilibria, they therefore guarantee that the probability distribution on plays associ-
ated with the solution set generically satisfies backwards induction, since for generic exten-
sive form games the probability distributions on plays are constant across every connected
component of Nash equilibria (see Kreps and Wilson, 1982).
3 This concept is slightly weaker than its preference-dependent analogue, precisely be-
cause for the latter coincidental payoff ties can render two strategies equivalent.
4 Such a preference-free extensive form representation amounts to insisting on robustness


































































4 Carlos Alo´s-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger
map into plays; plays are the domain of preferences and hence may be mapped
into payoff profiles in the full “game.” This is crucial, as the formulation as a
game form guarantees that ties only arise from extensive form structures and
not by coincidence. Hence, this is equivalent to a generic payoff assignment
where no two terminal nodes (or plays) yield the same payoff profile.
It is important to note that the difficulty we point out here will be com-
pletely obscured if one ignores the role of plays, which is highlighted by the
focus on game forms. If one focuses on payoffs instead, any normal form game
can be cast into a trivial (but non-equivalent) extensive form game where all
players choose at the root between their strategies and all the remaining nodes
are terminal. This extensive form game will have as many plays (or outcomes)
as cells in the normal form game, which will typically exceed the number of
plays in the original extensive form game that the normal form game was de-
rived from. This is inappropriate, since, first, by artificially changing the space
of plays/outcomes, it also changes the strategic elements of the problem,5 and,
second, backwards induction makes little sense in such a trivial extensive form
representation. If the goal is to integrate backwards induction into a normal
form solution concept, then the structure of the normal form must supply in-
formation about the extensive form—and this is achieved by the game form,
that rules out coincidental, knife-edge ties by its very construction.
2 The Example
To begin with, a few clarifications are in order. An extensive form with n ≥ 1
players is specified by a game tree and by choices and/or information sets for
each player. (There are no payoff assignments.) A play is a full path in the tree
from its root to a terminal node.6 A pure strategy for a player is a function
that maps this player’s information sets into choices that are available there.
The normal form is given by the function that maps strategy profiles into
plays. The reduced normal form is obtained by collapsing, for each player, into
single representatives all strategies that induce the same plays for all strategy
profiles among the opponents.
Now consider the extensive form depicted in Figure 1, which is a short
“centipede.” Player 1 starts and can stop (choice S1), which ends the game
with play ω1, or continue (choice C1). In the latter case, player 2 decides
between stopping (choice S2), which ends the game with play ω2, or continue
(choice C2). If the latter is chosen, player 1 decides again, choosing between
S3 and C3, which ends the game at plays ω3 or ω4, respectively.
5 For instance, a generic cell-based payoff perturbation of the reduced normal form game
can only originate from a trivial extensive form game were all players play simultaneously,
while a perturbation of the preferences defined on plays leaves the link between the original
extensive form game and its reduced normal form unaffected.
6 This at least applies if all plays end after finitely many moves. An infinitely repeated
game cast in extensive form provides an example of a game tree without terminal nodes.













































































Fig. 1 Graphical representation of the example.









Fig. 2 The normal form (left) and reduced normal form (right) of the example.
The normal form of the game is given on the left-hand side of Figure 2.
Since player 2 just decides once, among two choices, she has two pure strategies
that correspond to the choices. Player 1 decides at two different nodes, each
with two available choices. Hence he has four pure strategies, corresponding
to the combinations of the choices, which are called S1S3, S1C3, C1S3, and
C1C3. As the table shows, strategies S1S3 and S1C3 are strategically equiv-
alent, since they always yield the same play for any given strategy of player
2 (actually, they always simply yield the play ω1). Hence the reduced normal
form, depicted on the right-hand side of Figure 2, combines them into a single
strategy S.
We now ask the question of whether an extensive form can be defined
whose normal form is the one shown on the right-hand side of Figure 2, i.e. it
coincides with the reduced normal form of our example. That is, we seek an
extensive form having exactly four plays, such that the allocation of decision
nodes results in two pure strategies for player 2 and three pure strategies for
player 1, such that the six combinations induce the plays as summarized by
the right-had normal form in Figure 2. We keep the discussion free of any
particular formalism, but it can be adapted to any formalization of extensive







































































Fig. 3 Possible game trees to represent the reduced normal form.
Suppose such an extensive form existed. Since player 2 has exactly two
strategies, she can only decide in one node of this form, since if she decided
in more than one node, the smallest number of strategies would be four.7
Analogously, player 1, who has exactly three strategies, can only be active at
a single node. Thus, the tree of the hypothesized extensive form can only have
two moves (nodes that are not terminal), x1 (where player 1 decides), and x2
(where player 2 decides). There are then exactly two possibilities, whose trees
are depicted in Figure 3: either x1 follows x2, or vice versa.
Both trees have four plays, as should be the case. However, if x1 precedes
x2, player 1 must have two choices (hence pure strategies) that lead to fixed
plays (i.e. plays that do not change with the choice of player 2), in contradiction
with the reduced normal form (Figure 2, right). If x2 precedes x1, player 2 must
have one choice leading to a fixed play independently of the choice of player 1,
again in contradiction with the reduced normal form. Therefore, there exists
no extensive form whose normal form corresponds to the sought one. Hence,
we have proven that, in general, reduced normal forms derived from extensive
forms can not be represented as extensive forms.
Remark 1 It is important to note that the result does not depend on whether
or not imperfect information is allowed. The nonexistence of an extensive form
corresponding to the reduced normal form described above follows simply from
the fact that it is not possible to construct an extensive form with only four
plays that can be reached in a manner consistent with the strategic decisions
recorded in the reduced normal form. To clarify this point, consider the follow-
ing attempt to build an approximation of the strategic problem by relying on
imperfect information.8 Player 1 decides either to stop (S1), to continue left
(CL1), or to continue right (CR1). After S1, the game ends with the play ω1.
Both choices CL1 and CR1 lead to the same information set of player 2, that
is, the second player cannot distinguish whether player 1 has continued left or
right, but knows that she has not stopped. Then player 2 has two choices, S2
7 We assume here non-trivial decisions, where a player active at a node has at least two
choices. Some formalisms allow for trivial decision where one player has one and only one
choice. Allowing for those does not change the argument.
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Fig. 4 An imperfect information game failing to generate the reduced normal form.
and C2. Figure 4 depicts the game and the resulting normal form. Superficially,
one may impose that the two possible continuations of player 1 are analogous
to the two continuation possibilities of player 1 in the game depicted in Figure
1, namely C1S3 and C1C3. But this would be a statement about the players’
preferences: Neither player cares about whether player 1 continued “right”
or “left.” In the game in Figure 1, the strategy combinations (C1S3, S2) and
(C1C3, S2) induce the same play ω2, but in the game in Figure 4, the strategy
combinations (CL1, S2) and (CR1, S2) induce different plays, ω2 and ω5.
Specifically, suppose that one adds payoffs to the representation, and im-
poses that both players are exactly indifferent between ω2 and ω5. Then, the
payoff-based representations of the normal form games in Figures 1 and 4
would indeed coincide. But the reason is just a coincidental payoff tie, unre-
lated to the structure of the extensive form game. The reduced normal forms,
expressed in terms of plays, can never coincide.
3 Conclusion
It is well known from the work by Mailath et al. (1993) that payoff ties in the
reduced normal form of a finite game reflect extensive form structures, like
information sets or subgames. Yet, when players are assigned specific payoff
functions these ties may get confounded with coincidental ones. If one insists


































































8 Carlos Alo´s-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger
form, then the observation in this note casts doubt on the sufficiency of the re-
duced normal form: A given reduced normal form, where all equivalence classes
with respect to strategic equivalence are singletons, may not be representable
as an extensive form. To reconstruct an extensive form representation of a
given reduced normal form therefore takes information about the reduction
steps, which is not included in the normal form.
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